

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: WORKING GROUP II MEETING

10/23/75; TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO 69

1. SUMMARY. AT MEETING OF WORKING GROUP II, OCTOBER 23, REVIEW OF JOINT TEXT OF PROTOCOL I WAS CONDUCTED. SOVIETS STATED THEY WERE NOT INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS ARTICLES INCLUDED IN US PROTOCOL II. PROBLEM OF EXISTING DRILL HOLES WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY. SAFRONOV READ PROPOSAL ON NEW ARTICLE TO BE INCLUDED IN "A POLITICAL PROTOCOL" COVERING APPROACH TO VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR: (A) INDIVIDUAL YIELD FROM 100 TO 150 KILOTONS; (B) INDIVIDUAL YIELDS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS; (C) GROUP EXPLOSIONS WITH AGGREGATE YIELDS ABOVE 1000 KILOTONS. SAID RESPONSE TO HIS PROPOSAL COULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL MATTERS IN PROTOCOL II. END SUMMARY.

2. AT BEGINNING OF MEETING, US SIDE ASKED SOVIETS IF THEY WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ARTICLES IN US PROTOCOL II. SAFRONOV SAID THEY WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL MATTERS IN PROTOCOL I BUT NOT PROTOCOL II EXCEPT ON BASIS OF CONDITION OF PRINCIPLE HE WOULD PRESENT LATER. SOVIETS SAID DIFFERENCES IN PROTOCOL I FALL INTO TWO GROUPS. FIRST, NON-SUBSTANTIVE WORDING DIFFERENCES WHICH WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MFA. SECOND, DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE WHICH

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SAFRONOV EMPHASIZED ONCE MORE WERE FOR HEADS OF DELEGATION

TO SETTLE. US AGAIN ASKED IF SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS ARTICLES IN PROTOCOL II. SOVIETS SAID THEY HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO. BOTH SIDES DECIDED THAT ONE MORE REVIEW OF JOINT TEXTS OF US PROTOCOL I WOULD BE USEFUL TO REACH AGREEMENT WHERE POSSIBLE.

3. SOVIET SIDE INTRODUCED NEW PROVISION IN THEIR DRAFT PROTOCOL ARTICLE III PARA 2 PASSED TO US SIDE OCTOBER 21. BEGIN TEXT:

IN CASES WHEN DUE TO UNFORESEEN REASONS, THE PRESENTATION OF A STATEMENT CANNOT TAKE PLACE AT THE TIME PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH (7A) OF THIS ARTICLE, THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXPLOSION SHALL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE PLANNED EXPLOSION IN THE SHORTEST PRACTICALLY FEASIBLE PERIODS OF TIME AFTER MAKING THE DECISION CONCERNING ITS CONDUCT, BUT IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN . . . DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE EXPLOSION. END TEXT.

4. US SIDE ASKED SOVIET SIDE TO EXPLAIN INTENT. BEZUMOV SAID IT WAS TO TAKE CARE OF TWO POSSIBLE SITUATIONS. FIRST EXAMPLE WAS THAT OF EMERGENCY USE OF AN EXPLOSIVE FOR EXTINGUISHING A GASWELL FIRE, FOR WHICH THERE COULD BE NO LONG RANGE PLANNING. SECOND EXAMPLE WAS THAT OF DRILL HOLES NOW IN EXISTENCE, OR HOLES WHICH HAD BEEN DRILLED FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE. US SIDE ASKED HOW MANY SUCH HOLES MIGHT BE INVOLVED. MYASNIKOV SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT SAY; THERE ARE HOLES DRILLED FOR GAS AND OIL PRODUCTION; RESEARCH IN EXPLOSIVE DESIGN CAN LEAD TO SMALLER DIAMETER EXPLOSIVES WHICH COULD FIT IN THESE HOLES. THUS POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF USING SUCH EXPLOSIVES IN DRILL HOLES IN NON-PRODUCING FIELDS TO STIMULATE OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, MYASNIKOV SAID, TO FORESEE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF DRILL HOLES THAT MIGHT BE USED FOR SUCH APPLICATIONS. HE SAID WORDING OF NEW PARAGRAPH IS CONVENIENT TO DEAL WITH SUCH A SITUATION.

5. AFTER COMPLETION OF REVIEW OF JOINT TEXTS, SAFRONOV READ FOLLOWING PROPOSAL FOR INCLUSION IN "POLITICAL PROTOCOL":

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BEGIN TEXT: FOR CASE OF EXPLOSION WITH INDIVIDUAL YIELDS FROM 100 TO 150 KILOTONS OR MORE PARTY CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION SHALL ORGANIZE AND CARRY OUT BY ITS OWN TECHNICAL MEANS, WITH PARTICIPATION OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE (NOT SPECIFIED), SPECIAL MEASUREMENTS AT SITE OF EXPLOSION.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MEASUREMENT ARE TO BE BASED ON
FOLLOWING:

(A) AFOR VERIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP EXPLOSIONS, WITH YIELDS OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION UP TO 150 KILOTONS, CONFIRMATION OF YIELD OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSION MAY BE CARRIED OUT ON BASIS OF MEASUREMENT OF SHOCK WAVE FRONT NEAR EXPLOSION;

(B) FOR VERIFICATION OF GROUP EXPLOSION WITH YIELD EXCEEDING 1000 KILOTONS FOR PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION OF NUMBER OF EXPLOSIVES, PRINCIPLE OF MAKING SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS WITH HELP OF A GROUP OF SEISMIC INSTRUMENTS INSTALLED WITHIN AN AREA OF 10 KILOMETER RADIUS WILL BE USED;

(C) FOR VERIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS WITH A YIELD EXCEEDING 150 KILOTONS, SPECIAL METHODS OF VERIFICATION WILL HAVE TO BE PROVIDED WHICH COULD INCLUDE SEISMIC, RADIOCHEMICAL, OR OTHER MEASUREMENTS;

(D) TECHNICAL PRINCIPLE OF MEASUREMENTS. CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION, PROCEDURES OF INSTALLATION AND USE OF THE EQUIPMENT DESIGNED FOR IMPLEMENTING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THIS ARTICLE ARE AGREED UPON BY PARTIES. EXPLOSIONS REQUIRING UTILIZATION OF APPROPRIATE MEASUREMENTS CANNOT BE CONDUCTED ANY EARLIER THAN 90 DAYS AFTER TECHNICAL PROTOCOL BETWEEN PARTIES IS SIGNED. PARTIES IN PROCESS OF COOPERATING MAY ELABORATE NEW PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC FEATURES OF PROJECT. END TEXT.

7. SAFRONOV ELABORATED ON INTENTIONS OF PROPOSED ARTICLE. FOR INDIVIDUAL YIELDS UP TO 150 KILOTONS, PARTY CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION NOW AGREED
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UPON. FOR INDIVIDUAL YIELDS ABOVE 150 KILOTONS AND IN SOME CASES ABOVE 100 KILOTONS, SPECIAL METHODS ARE NEEDED, INCLUDING THOSE FOR YIELD MEASUREMENTS IN CLOSE-IN REGION. PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR PARTICIPATION OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. METHOD OF VERIFICATION REMAINS WITH PARTY CARRYING OUT EXPLOSION. MEANS AND METHOD OF INSTALLATION AGREED UPON BY PERSONNEL AT TECHNICAL LEVEL. EXPLOSION CANNOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE TECHNICAL AGREEMENT COVERING THAT EXPLOSION IS REACHED. FOR GROUP EXPLOSION OVER 1000 KILOTONS, PARTIES AGREE ON NUMBER OF SEISMIC INSTRUMENTS NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION OF NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS. (COMMENT: SAFRONOV READ PROPOSED ARTICLE FROM HAND-WRITTEN NOTES.)
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